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Abstract
Pirates are often described as existing on the margins of the world economy, emerging from 
the outskirts to disrupt otherwise free capitalist markets. With this narrative in mind, it is not 
surprising that the pirate remains a marginal figure within both the fictional stories and historical 
accounts of the emergence of capitalism. This article, however, asks: What do we learn about the 
capitalist world economy if we understand the pirate not as an outlaw but as a fellow capitalist? 
Weaving together stories of the golden age of piracy in the Atlantic world with contemporary 
piracy in the Gulf of Aden, I argue that pirate capitalism helps us to understand the capitalist 
world economy, not only demonstrating the violence and dispossession at the centre of capitalist 
accumulation but also making visible the fluid relationship between capital, sovereignty, violence, 
and freedom.
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Le capitalisme pirate, ou l’accumulation primitive du capital lui-même
Résumé
On décrit souvent les pirates comme existant en marge de l’économie mondiale, surgissant de 
ses abords pour venir perturber des marchés capitalistes par ailleurs libres. Cette représentation 
une fois posée, il n’est pas surprenant que le pirate demeure un personnage marginal des récits 
fictionnels ou historiques sur l’émergence du capitalisme. Cet article pose cependant la question 
suivante : Qu’apprenons-nous de l’économie mondiale capitaliste si nous voyons le pirate non 
pas comme un hors-la-loi, mais comme un capitaliste lui aussi ? Entremêlant récits de l’âge d’or 
de la piraterie dans le monde atlantique et de la piraterie contemporaine dans le golfe d’Aden, 
je défends la thèse que le capitalisme pirate facilite la compréhension de l’économie mondiale 
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capitaliste, non seulement en démontrant la violence et la dépossession qui se trouvent au cœur 
de l’accumulation capitaliste, mais aussi en révélant la relation fluide qui existe entre capital, 
souveraineté, violence et liberté.
Mots-clés
piraterie, accumulation primitive, capitalisme
El capitalismo pirata o la acumulación primitiva del capital
Resumen
A menudo se afirma que los piratas habitan en los márgenes de la economía mundial, desde donde 
aparecen para perturbar el libre mercado capitalista. Partiendo de este relato, no sorprende que 
el pirata aparezca aún como una figura marginal tanto en las narraciones de ficción, como en las 
explicaciones históricas sobre la emergencia del capitalismo. El presente artículo, sin embargo, se 
pregunta qué aporta a la comprensión de la economía mundial capitalista el hecho de no considerar 
al pirata como a alguien fuera de la ley, sino como un capitalista. A través de la relación entre las 
narraciones de la época dorada de la piratería en el Atlántico con la piratería contemporánea en 
el golfo de Adén, sostengo que el capitalismo pirata contribuye a la comprensión de la economía 
mundial capitalista, no solo al demostrar que la violencia y el desposeimiento se encuentran en 
el centro de la acumulación capitalista, sino también al hacer visibles las fluidas relaciones que 
existen entre el capital, la soberanía, la violencia y la libertad.
Palabras clave
piratería, acumulación primitiva, capitalismo
[W]e might say that imperialism is piracy transplanted from the seas to dry land, piracy 
reorganised, consolidated and adapted to the aim of plundering the natural and human resources 
of our peoples.
– Amilcar Cabral1
If the world stops stealing our property and harming us…[w]e will stop the piracy and go back 
to our normal jobs.
– Sugule Ali2
Between 2005 and 2013 pirates made a dramatic reappearance upon the world stage, this 
time in the shipping lanes of the Gulf of Aden. This event garnered considerable media 
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and cultural attention, and one of the most dramatic episodes – the capture of the Maersk 
Alabama followed by the daring rescue of Captain Phillips – became widely memorial-
ised within popular culture.3 Many stories told about piracy in the Gulf of Aden, how-
ever, reduce pirates to mere criminal threats: problems to be solved. Kraska and Wilson, 
for example, describe ‘Somali maritime gangs’ and focus on ‘millions of dollars in ran-
som payments’, the killing of mariners, and the general economic instability that results.4 
As often happens, however, the picture becomes more complicated once pirates tell their 
own stories. Pirates, in contrast, tell of economic deprivation at the hands of toxic waste 
dumpers and predatory international fishing companies.5 Sugule Ali – a pirate who, in 
2008, captured the Ukrainian ship Faina carrying military hardware heading to Kenya 
– summed up his calculation as: ‘[w]e only want money so we can protect ourselves from 
hunger’.6
It is not coincidental that both narratives – hero and villain – draw upon the now vast 
archive of pirate lore dating back to the ‘golden age of piracy’ in the Atlantic world 
(1650s through 1720s). For example, Kraska and Wilson write that the ‘boldness and 
international scope of the maritime piracy campaign’ in the Gulf of Aden ‘recalls the 
‘golden age’ of Caribbean piracy’.7 Others write that, while ‘Somalia’s modern sea ban-
dits may lack some of the “colour” of the “buried treasure, peg legs, and Jolly Roger”, 
they nonetheless have been “aided by the news media’s inexorable search for a good 
yarn”’.8 I would argue that these nods are not mere rhetorical flourish, but rather an 
acknowledgement of the important commonalities between modern pirates and those 
inhabiting the Atlantic world during the age of sail. If listened to, these multi-genera-
tional stories can reveal much about the emergence, transformation, and continuity of the 
capitalist world economy.
Like their ancestors in the Caribbean, pirates in the Gulf of Aden9 are commonly pre-
sented as ‘extra-economic’ exceptions to the otherwise seamless flow of goods and 
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services within a world economy. Commonly described as existing on the margins of the 
capitalist world economy, piracy becomes represented as a political/security issue rather 
than an economic activity. As such, piracy in the Gulf of Aden is commonly misunder-
stood as simply the particular result of localised state failure, rather than ‘a symptom of 
larger, structural relations’ within the world economy.10 However, if treated as an oppor-
tunity for critical theory,11 piracy opens the possibility of examining the evolving rela-
tionships of primitive accumulation undergirding the capitalist world economy.
Like David Harvey,12 I use the term ‘primitive accumulation’ not merely to describe a 
historical moment demarcated by the enclosure movement in England, or the disposses-
sion in the Atlantic World, but rather to explain an ongoing process whereby state vio-
lence is routinely used to police and reinforce the separation between producers and the 
means of production.13 Most descriptions of primitive accumulation, however, assume 
states and capital conspire more-or-less seamlessly to enclose those commons – land, 
labour, and natural resources – existing beyond capital. While pirate capitalism makes 
explicit the function violence plays in capitalist accumulation, it also demonstrates the 
role of sovereign powers in determining who is (and is not) deemed the ‘enemy of all 
mankind’. The pirate must be destroyed because s/he is the capitalist who dares engage 
in the primitive accumulation of capital itself.
In this way, the pirate engages in a kind of ‘border thinking’, existing at the ‘intense 
battlefield’ between ‘colonial modernities’ and the lived worlds of the subaltern.14 
Existing on the violent border of capitalist accumulation, the vast spaces of maritime 
circulation, and sovereign power, the pirate is uniquely well positioned to provide an 
account of the modern/colonial capitalist economy. A liminal figure – simultaneously a 
‘villain and hero’, both ‘revered and reviled’15 – the pirate continually faces the threat of 
extinction at the hands of overwhelming state-sponsored violence, yet often re-emerges 
across those temporal, spatial, material, and cultural histories constituting the world 
economy. As a staple of popular culture, existing as both charismatic hero and despised 
villain, pirates illuminate the conflicting capitals, sovereignties, and freedoms that 
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constitute the world order.16 After all, this multi-century ‘popular love affair’ with pirates 
stems from the fact that pirates ‘transgress’ legal jurisdiction, living both ‘inside and 
outside’ the sovereignty of the nation-state.17 They exist instead as a ‘third category’ – 
neither citizens governed by national law nor states subject to international treaty. Living 
on the border of the nation-state and international law means that, since Cicero, pirates 
have been deemed a species worthy of categorical eradication – the ‘enemy of human-
kind’.18 The hyperbolic military retaliation that follows stems not from the fact that 
pirates actually threaten all humanity, but rather that their very existence exposes the 
legal, military, and economic necessity – yet practical impossibility – of extending state 
sovereignty over the commons of the high seas. Pirates, in other words, threaten the 
state’s ability to ‘govern beyond the geographical authority of government’.19
While pirates thrive within the public imaginary, they remain largely excluded from 
the stories we tell about the origins of capitalism. This is unfortunate because the mariner 
has always been a central source of knowledge about this vast, interconnected world. 
Markus Rediker argues that, during the ‘age of sail’, the sailor’s yarn was a primary form 
in which knowledge about the world circulated. In stories told below deck, sailors – the 
first industrial workers – co-created a body of primary knowledge about the far-flung 
world.20 Gentleman scholars, including the political pamphleteer, Daniel Defoe, often 
went down to the docks – literally or figuratively – to hear the sailors tell their yarns, and 
incorporated their maritime knowledge into the philosophy, poetry, science, and litera-
ture of the day.21 I suggest that in order to understand the origins of the capitalist world 
economy we once again go down to the docks to listen to these pirate sailors – whether 
in the Atlantic world or the Gulf of Aden – to see what this maritime border knowledge 
tells us about capitalist accumulation.
To do so, this article takes seriously the fact that pirates are simultaneously partici-
pants within world markets and mainstays within the modern imaginary. This article, 
therefore, examines the pirate at both registers, acknowledging a close relationship 
between capitalist accumulation and the stories we tell about it. Therefore, to understand 
the relationship between the pirate, capitalism, and primitive accumulation we start in an 
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 22. A privateer is a private ship that, by receiving a letter of marque from the sovereign of one 
country, is empowered to attack ships flying the flag of another country. Drawing on the Old 
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admittedly unlikely place: namely, a reading of Robinson Crusoe. Since the publication 
of Daniel Defoe’s novel in 1719, Crusoe routinely stands in for the paradigmatic figure 
of homo economicus. Crusoe rationally mixes his labour with nature to meet his personal 
utility and, in doing so, transforms a barren island landscape into bountiful private prop-
erty. While liberal economists have plucked Crusoe from his island to tell yarns about 
demand curves and marginal returns, the Atlantic world Crusoe actually inhabited was 
populated by pirates, privateers,22 slaves, slave traders, indentured servants, conscripts, 
soldiers, settlers, and displaced native populations. In fact, the vessel that deposits Crusoe 
upon his island is a slaving ship heading for the African coast – with Crusoe as its cap-
tain. Similarly, the vessel that delivers him from the island is a merchant ship comman-
deered by pirate mutineers.
After examining Defoe’s fictional narrative, we turn to contemporary scholars exam-
ining the historical rise of the modern world economy. While these accounts pay greater 
critical attention to primitive accumulation, the pirate remains notably absent, thereby 
failing to represent primitive accumulation as a contested process. I conclude by leaving 
the age of sail to explore contemporary piracy in the Gulf of Aden, where violence and 
dispossession remain at the heart of capitalist accumulation as pirates continue to navi-
gate the ever-evolving relationship between capital and sovereignty. While pirates of the 
Atlantic world replicated the violence of merchant and plantation capitalism, pirates in 
the Gulf of Aden have similarly responded to primitive accumulation by creating well-
financed venture capital firms, with salaried employees, subcontractors, franchisees, and 
corporate governance structures. However, while pirates replicate the violent world 
around them, what still marks Edward Teach (aka Blackbeard) and Sugule Ali as the 
enemy of all mankind remains the simple fact that they dare engage in the primitive 
accumulation of capital itself.
Capitalism, Piracy, and Primitive Accumulation
For liberal political and economic thinkers, the image of hardworking men and women, 
mixing their labour with nature and pursuing their ‘propensity to truck, barter, and 
exchange’23 stands at great odds with the hedonist figure of the maritime bandit, living 
freely and accumulating wealth through violence and force. After a quick look at Defoe’s 
Robinson Crusoe – that strange fable retold by classical economists – it becomes appar-
ent that the rational, toiling protagonist of liberal economic thought (whom we might call 
‘Crusoe–on–the–island’) is only possible by actively ignoring the omnipresent slaves, 
slavers, and pirates who actually traverse Defoe’s novel, and the Atlantic world more 
generally.
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Crusoe and the Stories Told by Liberal Economists
In Second Treaties of Government (1690) John Locke asked his reader to imagine ‘an 
island, separate from all possible commerce with the rest of the world’.24 Locke – him-
self profiting from the slave trade25 – surmised that the people on this island would lack 
the incentive to cultivate the land beyond what the family could consume and, as a con-
sequence, vast tracts of land ‘would not be worth the inclosing’ and instead be ‘give[n] 
up again to the wild common of nature’.26 Less than 30 years after Locke’s Second 
Treaties Daniel Defoe published Robinson Crusoe, widely regarded as the world’s first 
novel.27 Originally presented as Crusoe’s autobiography, this book profoundly captured 
the modern imagination.28 Despite Locke’s prediction otherwise, Crusoe – a man ship-
wrecked on a deserted Caribbean island – commits himself to cultivating the earth, even 
in the absence of ‘commerce with the rest of the world’.29 The ever-rational Crusoe 
encloses nature through his own toil, reaping, storing, and savouring the goods he pro-
duces. He uses his limited paper and ink to studiously maintain ledgers of all the hours 
spent working, and the wealth he generates through such labours.30
In the centuries since its publication, Crusoe has become a common set piece in clas-
sical liberal explanations of the capitalist world economy. Adam Smith and David 
Ricardo each ground their economic theories in Crusoe-like stories. Smith, for example, 
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describes the division of labour as originating in that ‘early and rude state of society’ in 
which hunters exchange deerskins for beaver pelts. Smith surmises that individuals who 
endure ‘superior hardship’ and possess ‘superior skill’ will accumulate surplus stock, 
hire additional labourers, and thereby instigate the division of labour.31 By the late 1800s, 
the figure of Crusoe himself appears within the writing of liberal economists who crib his 
story ‘to illustrate the principles of supply and demand economic theory’, and the activ-
ity of a ‘rational economic individual’ who ‘allocat[es] his available resources to obtain 
maximum satisfaction’.32 In fact, Crusoe populates many of the ‘founding texts of neo-
classical economics, including those written by Jennings, Bastiat, Gossen, Jevons, 
Menger, Wicksell, Wicksteed, Edgeworth, Clark and Marshal’, among others.33 A cen-
tury later, Crusoe still inhabited the pages of the neoclassical economists.34 In Capitalism 
and Freedom, for example, Milton Friedman defines a ‘free private enterprise exchange 
economy’ as akin to ‘a collection of Robinson Crusoes’.35
The similarity between Defoe’s novel and the yarns told by liberal political econo-
mists was not lost on Karl Marx, who wrote that the ‘solitary and isolated hunter or 
fisherman, who serves Adam Smith and Ricardo as a starting point, is one of the unim-
aginative fantasies of eighteenth-century romances a la Robinson Crusoe’.36 In creating 
Crusoe, Defoe became one of the ‘prophets of the eighteenth century, on whose shoul-
ders Adam Smith and Ricardo were still wholly standing’, providing a portrait of the 
rational and autonomous individual ‘not as something evolving’ but rather ‘posited by 
nature’.37 In the first chapter of Capital Vol 1., for example, Marx excoriates Ricardo 
who, being ‘fond of Robinson Crusoe stories’, fundamentally fails to understand that 
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human labour is never isolated.38 While Crusoe’s activity on the island is ‘his own per-
sonal labour’, the same is not true in any other circumstance. When we ‘transport our-
selves from Robinson’s island’ and head anywhere else – whether ‘medieval Europe’, 
industrial England, or a future comprised of an ‘association of free men’ – labour is 
always social and organised by the proportion that one contributes to the entire produc-
tion process.39
Marx also critiqued the Robinsonade stories told by liberal economists because they 
failed to appreciate that capitalist accumulation fundamentally depends upon violence. 
By the end of Capital Marx returns to refute Smith’s mythical narrative of capitalism’s 
emergence among skilful hunters, and traces instead the origin of capitalism to the ‘origi-
nal sin’ of ‘primitive accumulation’.40 Capital’s ‘pre-history’41 actually involves the vio-
lent capture, enclosure, and enslavement of resources, nature, and peoples.
The discovery of gold and silver in America, the extirpation, enslavement and entombment in 
mines of the indigenous population of the continent, the beginnings of the conquest and plunder 
of India, and the conversion of Africa into a preserve for the commercial hunting of blackskins, 
are all things which characterise the dawn of the era of capitalist production. These idyllic 
proceedings are the chief moments of primitive accumulation.42
The violence of primitive accumulation, rather than the skilful and thrifty workman, cre-
ated the surplus capital needed to birth industrial society. As such, the capital that 
‘appears today in the United States without any birth-certificate, was yesterday, in 
England, the capitalised blood of children’, and the ‘veiled slavery’ of European wage-
labour was constructed upon the ‘pedestal’ of ‘the unqualified slavery of the New 
World’.43
Crusoe and an Atlantic World of Primitive Accumulation
While liberal economists fetishise an isolated Crusoe-on-the-island, both Crusoe and 
Defoe actually lived in worlds structured by primitive accumulation. At the level of the 
story, Robinson Crusoe is riddled through with ‘conquest, slavery, robbery, murder and 
force’.44 After all, Crusoe’s stock is not skilfully collected from nature, as Smith would 
predict, but rather a vast quantity of supplies retrieved from a shipwreck (guns, swords, 
shot, powder, saws, a screw-jack, grinding stone, pipe, tobacco, ropes, canvas, clothes, 
12 Millennium: Journal of International Studies 47(1)
 45. Defoe, Robinson Crusoe, 40–7.
 46. Ibid., 15–16.
 47. Ibid., 28–9.
 48. Ibid., 31.
 49. Ibid., 32.
 50. Ibid., 33.
 51. Ibid., 33.
 52. Ibid., 157–8.
 53. Ibid., 162–81.
paper, ink, three Bibles, nails, two dozen hatchets, iron and ironwork, two saws, rum, a 
hammock, bedding, chests, barrels, needles, thread, and so on).45 And as the story dem-
onstrates, this original stock was available to Crusoe because of a vast economy of 
violence.
Crusoe begins his maritime adventures on-board a slave ship headed for Guinea.46 On 
his second voyage, off the coast of Africa, Barbary pirates seize the ship, enslaving 
Crusoe and the crew. After two years, Crusoe escapes with the help of a fellow slave, a 
Moorish boy named Xury. Upon finding a Portuguese slaving vessel, Crusoe sells: the 
boat they had escaped on; the leopard and lion skins shot and cured with Xury’s assis-
tance; and ‘my boy Xury’ himself – receiving ‘220 Pieces of Eight’ and free passage to 
Brazil in exchange.47 Once in Brazil, Crusoe uses the money to purchase a plantation as 
well as an unnamed ‘Negro slave, and an European [indentured] servant’.48 After a few 
years, Crusoe’s plantation begins to prosper, allowing him to spend his free time regaling 
his neighbours with stories about voyages to West Africa and ‘how easy it was to pur-
chase’ not only ‘gold dust, Guinea grains, elephant teeth, & c’. but also ‘Negros’.49 
However, British victory in the War of Spanish Succession, and the signing of the 
Asiento, meant that ‘few Negroes were bought’ in Brazil and those available were 
‘excessive[ly] dear’.50 Crusoe’s plantation-owning friends eventually convince him to 
organise an illegal, privately funded slaving expedition to West Africa. It was agreed that 
the plantation owners would ‘fit out a ship to go to Guinea’, and Crusoe would captain 
it. In exchange Crusoe would receive ‘my equal share of the Negroes without providing 
any part of the stock’.51 It was this ship – paid for with the profits of primitive accumula-
tion – that became his original stock upon Crusoe’s otherwise unpopulated island.
Primitive accumulation continues once on the island as well. After discovering a foot-
print in the sand, Crusoe concludes that his own deliverance depends upon getting ‘a 
savage into my possession’: ‘one, nay, two or three savages’ and ‘make them entirely 
slaves to me’.52 His desire to once again become a ‘Master’ is realised when freeing the 
‘comely handsome fellow’ from ‘cannibals’. Crusoe clothes Friday in European attire, 
teaches him first ‘run and fetch’ and later to cook and bake, and regularly appropriates 
his labour: ‘I made my man Friday dig a little dock’ and ‘bid him go to the sea shore, and 
see if he could find’ turtle eggs to eat.53
This island economy is once again disrupted when an English ship anchors near the 
island, and a group of mutineers brings the ship’s captain and two crewmembers onshore 
as bounded prisoners. Intuitively siding with the captain, Crusoe and Friday free the cap-
tives after securing concession that they ‘will not pretend to any authority’ while on the 
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island.54 As self-declared governor, Crusoe decides to hang the leader as a pirate, but 
spares the other mutineers – while stating that no one could ‘doubt I had authority’ to 
execute them all.55 In deciding to maroon the pirates instead, Crusoe promises to send 
women and supplies in return for their promise to maintain his island possessions while 
away. As governor, Crusoe claims sovereignty to retain some pirates in profitable ser-
vice, while deciding that others should be hung ‘at the yard-arm’.56 Once again, ‘[l]aw 
makes criminals and criminals make settlers’.57
Primitive accumulation is not only central to Crusoe’s world but also forms the very 
conjuncture that made the book possible. As the story goes, the British privateer William 
Dampier, having received a letter of marque, left England in 1703 to pursue Spanish gal-
leons operating in the Pacific Ocean. As Dampier rounded Cape Horn, crewman 
Alexander Selkirk expressed fear that the vessel was no longer sea worthy. Stopping for 
supplies on the Juan Fernández islands off the Chilean coast, Selkirk requested he be left 
behind.58 Four years later, Dampier returned as a pilot for Captain Woodes Rogers’ pri-
vateering expedition to discover Selkirk living alone in a hut surrounded by a herd of 
domesticated goats.59 Selkirk then joined the crew of the Duke and the Duchess, with 
whom he traversed the west coast of South America, capturing vessels, attacking and 
ransoming a village, and selling pirated slaves.60 After returning to England in 1711 
Selkirk became an instant celebrity after Richard Steele chronicled his experiences in the 
tabloid The Englishman.61 Defoe read the account of Selkirk – and quite possibly met the 
mariner himself – shortly before penning the novel Robinson Crusoe, which bears con-
siderable similarities to Selkirk’s experience.62
Given the dissonance between the fantasy of an ever-rational Crusoe-on-the-island 
and the violent reality of the Atlantic world, the absence of piracy within the stories told 
by liberal economists is not entirely surprising. The notable exception is Peter Leeson, 
who argues that piracy in the Atlantic world actually follows the same logics of liberal 
economics: namely, pirates are ‘self-interested’, rational, and ‘respond to incentives’.63 
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Rather than treating pirates as ‘flamboyant, bizarre, and downright shocking’, Leeson 
contends that pirates were actually ‘rationally responding to the unusual economic con-
text they operated in – which generated unusual costs and benefits’.64 Here, Leeson 
essentially plucks Crusoe from the island and places him on board a pirate ship. In doing 
so, Leeson shows little appreciation for the fact that violence and dispossession are far 
from ‘unusual’ within the capitalist world economy. Any comparison between pirates 
and capitalist, therefore, should not rest upon some notion of common rationality and 
self-interest, but rather upon the shared propensity to acquire wealth through violence.
Primitive Accumulation and Pirate Capitalism
Today numerous political economists, historians, and scholars of international politics 
have argued that primitive accumulation within the Atlantic world between the 17th 
through 19th centuries profoundly shaped the modern world economy. Eric Williams, for 
example, famously demonstrated that bonded slave labour – first white then black – cre-
ated the capital upon which British banking, shipping, manufacturing, insurance compa-
nies, and therefore the entire industrial revolution were built.65 Since then, other scholars 
have carefully shown that the rise of modern British and American industrial capitalism 
emerged from the plantation and chattel slavery.66 Other scholars have debunked the 
ethnocentric claims that modern capitalism originated in Europe before radiating out-
wards to Africa, Asia, and the Americas. These historical accounts place a renewed 
importance on the Atlantic world as one of the many locations that made the modern 
capitalist economy possible.67
Such arguments about the origins of modern capitalist world economy tend to place 
primitive accumulation front and centre, yet still have little to say about piracy. Alexander 
Anievas and Kerem Nişancioğlu, for example, powerfully demonstrate that ‘capitalism 
could only emerge, take root and reproduce itself…through a violent, coercive, and often 
war-assisted process subjugating, dominating, and often annihilating many of those 
Kamola 15
 68. Anievas and Nişancioğlu, How the West Came to Rule, 12.
 69. Ibid., 146–15; also see, Peter Linebaugh and Marcus Rediker, The Many-Headed Hydra: 
Sailors, Slaves, Commoners, and the Hidden History of the Revolutionary Atlantic (Boston: 
Beacon Press, 2000), 36–70.
 70. Anievas and Nişancioğlu, How the West Came to Rule, 153.
 71. Ibid., 153.
 72. Ibid., 153.
 73. Beckert, Empire of Cotton, 29–55.
 74. Marcus Rediker, Villains of All Nations: Atalantic Pirates in the Golden Age (Boston: 
Beacon Press, 2004), 6.
 75. Ibid., 5–6.
 76. Ibid., 50.
 77. Ibid., 60–6; Leeson, The Invisible Hook, 23–44.
 78. Leeson, The Invisible Hook, 23–44.
social forces that stood in its way – processes that continue to this day’.68 Within the 
Atlantic, European empires created a labour force comprised first of enslaved Amerindian 
populations and European expatriates, made landless after the enclosure of the com-
mons.69 In England, the ‘iron discipline’ of the state served as ‘one of the fundamental 
levers’ that ensured a ‘dispossessed class of peasants could be terrorised into a new work 
discipline based on the capitalist mode’.70 However, within the Americas, the state’s 
power was much weaker, and therefore a greater ‘impulse for rebellion’ against the ‘strict 
and onerous work regimes’ was possible.71 Within this context, many English settlers and 
escaped slaves joined Native American societies, created their own communities within 
a vast ungoverned landscape, or fashioned ‘more itinerant communities in the shape of 
bands of pirates and buccaneers’.72
Anievas and Nişancioğlu, however, still present the pirate as a momentary escape 
from the unfolding synthesis of state-sponsored violence and capitalist accumulation. 
The pirate, however, not only represents a momentary flight from the state-sponsored 
primitive accumulation, but also the personification of violence as a possible political 
and economic response to such predation. While merchant and slave ships, plantations, 
colonial administrators, and imperial navies constructed ‘war capitalism’ within the 
Americas, Africa, and Asia,73 some communities turned to violence to construct an alter-
native social formation: pirate capitalism. Pirate capitalism was a crudely egalitarian and 
autonomous social and economic order, existing as the second dimension of the ‘dialec-
tic of terror’.74 The pirate represented the antithesis to the formalised terror of the whip, 
shackles, and gallows used ‘to protect property, to punish those who resisted its law’ and 
‘instil fear in sailors who might wish to become pirates’.75 Pirate crews instead con-
structed themselves as communities of mutineers fleeing impressment, former slaves, 
Native Americans, and ‘almost without exception’ members of the ‘lowest social 
classes’.76 As such, the pirate ship became a ‘new social order’ – a ‘rough, improvised, 
but effective egalitarianism’.77 Upon joining, crew members signed a ‘compact’ agreeing 
to ship rules. All crew members participated in a ‘common council’ that – based on the 
principle of one pirate, one vote – elected the captain (who led the ship in battle) and the 
quartermaster (who distributed the chores, food, and treasure). The crew also meted out 
punishment, which could include executing a despotic captain.78 Looted treasure was 
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divided according to a share system in which all crew members received one share, while 
privileged positions (gunners, doctors, carpenters, etc.) earned 1.25–1.5 shares, and the 
captain and quartermaster received 1.5–2 shares.79 Crews often created proto-social 
security systems in which contributions to a ‘common fund’ helped cover the needs of 
injured members.80 These techniques of social self-organisation were spread widely 
throughout pirate culture, and reproduced themselves as crews split apart, joined and re-
joined, and incorporated new members.81 Like capitalists of their time, pirates in the 
Atlantic world accumulated their wealth through violence and enclosure, but – rather 
than doing so for a master – pirates constituted themselves into a democratic ‘people 
without a nation’ with the aim of ‘escaping to something new’.82
It should be noted, however, that pirate capitalism constantly navigated the border of 
‘private’ and ‘public’ forms of violence, as enclaves of freedom often folded back into 
sovereign power. In this way, piracy was akin to ‘privateering, naval warfare, trade and 
diplomacy’, which all relied upon ‘the combination of private and public mobilizations of 
force, authority, manpower and resources’ at a historical moment when ‘war and violence 
at sea’ formed the ‘necessary components of wealth-creation, circulation and accumula-
tion’.83 In this milieu, pirates often found themselves recruited and deputised by imperial 
powers. State-sanctioned pirates – or, privateers – were often employed to project military 
and economic power across the ocean; they received substantial private investment and 
were granted the sovereign right to plunder ships flying the flag of another country. In 
doing so, they returned considerable profits for their landed investors.84 Chartered by let-
ters of marque, privateers enabled European powers to deploy privately funded ocean-
going violence across the vast oceanic spaces over which they otherwise lacked sovereign 
authority. However, after the Spanish defeat in the War of Spanish Succession (1702–1715), 
the British crown increasingly used its now unrivalled naval power to crack down on both 
pirating and privateering in order to consolidate its imperial maritime sovereignty. Many of 
the most prominent Atlantic pirates emerged from this reserve army of unemployed priva-
teers, now sailing for no sovereign, and recognising no flag. Edward Teach, for example, 
served as a privateer for the British during the War of Spanish Succession, before taking up 
piracy in the Caribbean and off the Carolina coast. In 1718, Teach left piracy to again serve 
as a privateer, this time in the favour of the Governor of South Carolina.85 Like Governor 
Crusoe, the state determines which pirates to employ and which to execute, a power bound 
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up in the creation of modern nation-states. For example, the United States constitution 
grants Congress the power to ‘define and punish Piracies’ and to ‘grant Letters of Marque’.86
However, the solidification of industrial capitalism and rise of the modern nation-
state necessitated the violent persecution of pirates. By the late 1720s European powers 
engaged in a ‘campaign of extermination’, seeking to redefine pirates as ‘monsters, 
beasts, and “the common enemies of mankind”’ within the popular imagery, while also 
exerting unparalleled militarily power to – quite literally – rip pirates limb-from-limb.87 
A century later, during its campaign against slavery, the British Empire redefined slave 
traders as pirates and, therefore, the ‘enemies of mankind’. As such, British jurists laid 
the groundwork for the concept of ‘crimes against humanity’, which became the basic 
framework of international law.88
While the military, legal, and cultural assault on piracy successfully brought an end to 
the golden age, pirates had nonetheless ‘captured the good ship Popular Imagination’.89 
In the centuries since the British Empire exerted sovereign control over the high seas, 
pirates continued to emerge within those vast maritime – as well as terrestrial, cultural, 
and cyber – spaces over which states remained unable to police the distinction between 
‘legitimate’ and ‘illegitimate’ forms of dispossession. During the first decades of the 21st 
century, as the capitalist world economy once again undergoes a profound restructuring, 
the pirates that once roamed the Atlantic during the age of sail have been joined by a new 
lineage of pirates who dispossess oil wealth from multinationals working the Niger 
Delta90 and pillage the shipping lanes in the Strait of Malacca, the Strait of Singapore, 
and the South China Sea.91 Today, the Pirate Bay remains a major conduit for reallocat-
ing seized wealth, but instead of dealing in captured sugar, slaves, and rum, modern-day 
pirates use this cove to redistribute movies, music, and software. But no contemporary 
piracy has caught the public imagination more than those plying the Gulf of Aden.
Pirate Capitalism in the Gulf of Aden
Most yarns told by journalists, academics, and security experts describe pirates in the 
Gulf of Aden as a rag-tag group of profit-seeking criminals operating as an organised 
criminal organisation.92 However, as in the Atlantic world, pirates in the Gulf of Aden 
exist within a longer history of primitive accumulation, one marked by colonial rule, the 
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Cold War, and the highly militarised global war on terror. They also operate not as excep-
tions to contemporary forms of capitalism, but rather – as with their Atlantic counterparts 
– extensions of its ever-evolving logic of accumulation. As such, pirates today closely 
resemble a start-up firm, with international financing, a highly professionalised work-
force, and an army of subcontractors. However, the major difference between pirates in 
the Gulf of Aden and a pre-IPO start-up remains the fact that pirates have the audacity to 
engage in the primitive accumulation of capital itself.
The Long History of Primitive Accumulation in the Gulf of Aden
The expansion of European industrial capitalism during the 19th century required greatly 
expanded flows of raw materials and manufactured goods between metropole and col-
ony, which necessitated the enclosure of the Gulf of Aden as a strategic artery of imperial 
control.93 Starting in the 1880s, Italy began colonising southern Somalia, and by 1919 
established a plantation economy that produced ‘cotton, sugar, bananas, oil and soap’ for 
the Italian market.94 In 1960, British Somaliland and Italian Somalia were granted inde-
pendence and, in a controversial referendum, joined together as the Republic of Somalia. 
The newly created Republic of Somalia inherited very weak institutions, an impover-
ished economic base, and a state designed to pose little threat to European control over 
this strategic waterway. Nine years after independence, Siyad Barre overthrew the fragile 
pro-Western democratic government and, siding with the Soviet Union, declared a policy 
of Scientific Socialism. After the Marxist revolution in Ethiopia, the US and the Soviet 
Union switched clients and the Americans poured massive military resources into 
Somalia to prop up the Barre government.95 Lacking a significant export economy and 
heavily reliant upon imports, Somalia developed a massive trade deficit that, by 1980, 
required an International Monetary Fund (IMF) bailout.96 Neighbouring Arab states, 
western countries, the IMF, and World Bank placed external pressure on Somalia to lib-
eralise its fragile economy.97 In this context, the Barre government used military force to 
seek access to the relative wealth in the north, provoking an armed opposition. Facing 
dwindling international support and an on-going civil war the government finally col-
lapsed in 1991 resulting in decades of continued struggle between local warlords, the 
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Islamic Courts Union, Al-Qaeda linked Al-Shabaab, the internationally backed Federal 
Government, the US-sponsored Ethiopian army, and the autonomous regional govern-
ments of Somaliland and Puntland.
The absence of national sovereignty made the area ripe for foreigners to engage in the 
dispossession of Somalia’s vast maritime wealth. Since 1991, an estimated 700 foreign 
vessels have plundered somewhere between $150–$450 million worth of marine life 
annually, including millions in tuna, shark, lobster and deep-water shrimp.98 These 
unregulated trawlers – owned by European and Asian firms – have effectively destroyed 
the local fishing industry, creating one of the primary causes of piracy.99
The absence of sovereignty over Somalia’s coastline also made it a highly profitable 
place for companies to dispose of toxic waste. Swiss and Italian companies with alleged 
mafia assistance100 brokered deals to dump waste at $2.50 per ton, compared to the $250 
per ton needed to dispose of the same materials under European regulations.101 The waste 
included ‘uranium radioactive waste, lead, cadmium, mercury, industrial, hospital, 
chemical, leather treatment and other toxic waste’ dumped ‘without regard to the health 
of the local population and any environmentally devastating impacts’.102 After the 2004 
Asian Tsunami, containers began washing up on shore. One pirate, Farah Ismail Eid, tells 
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the story of finding fish along the beach: ‘We thought we were lucky. We collected the 
fish and stored them in refrigerators, then later we discovered they were like plastic’.103
In response to such dispossession Somali fishermen organised themselves into self-
appointed naval militias. Taking names such as the Central Somalia Coast Guard, the 
National Volunteer Coast Guard, and the Somali Marines, these groups sought to keep 
foreign fishing vessels out of coastal waters, ransoming hijacked trawlers as an informal 
taxation system. Sugule Ali confirms this, pointing out that the actual ‘sea bandits’ are 
‘those who illegally fish in our seas and dump waste in our seas and carry weapons in our 
seas. We are simply patrolling our seas’.104 Eid similarly claimed: ‘the title of pirates 
should be given to those who come to our waters illegally’.105
By the mid-1990s foreign fleets found their own market solution – hiring ‘local war-
lords’ to provide ‘armed guards and anti-aircraft guns fixtures’ on fishing trawlers.106 As 
a consequence, the badaadinta badah (‘saviours of the sea’) found policing coastal 
waters increasingly dangerous and began turning their attention towards the more valu-
able cargo passing through the region.107 In other words, the ‘resource pirates’ who plun-
dered Somalia’s maritime wealth, gave rise to a navy of ‘defensive pirates’, eventually 
morphing into the more widely known ‘ransom pirates’.108
(Pirate) Capitalism
If one ignores the spectacle of AK-47s and RPGs, piracy in the Gulf of Aden closely 
resembles a nimble, post-Fordist start-up company, funded by venture capitalists and 
employing an army of subcontractors. Each individual joining a pirate crew (and pos-
sessing his own weapon) receives one ‘Class A’ share. Additional Class A shares are 
given to those bringing a skiff or heavy weapon (such as a RPG) or who board a boat 
first. Foreign or domestic investors outfit pirate crews with ships, weapons, global posi-
tioning systems, satellite phones, food, and fuel. Once captured, ships are held in harbour 
where guards, interpreters, and cooks receive ‘Class B’ shares for their services.109 Local 
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[and] air time’, supplying them on credit and often at a considerable mark-up.110 Those 
negotiating the ransom are often sub-contractors working on commission. Once deliv-
ered by money drop (often by a sub-contracted private security firm) or electronic trans-
fer, the payment is divided up among the stakeholders: ‘fixed costs’ are paid to the local 
merchants; financiers receive their standard 30 percent; local elders receive 5–10 percent 
for ‘anchoring rights’; Class B shares are paid out at a determined flat rate (approxi-
mately $15,000 each); and the remaining profit is divided equally among all the Class A 
shareholders.111 While it is tempting to imagine that multi-million dollar ransoms trans-
late into considerable windfalls for everyone involved, as with corner boys on the world’s 
drug markets, the long hours and high competition often means that most pirates receive 
the equivalent of a paltry hourly wage.112
The financing closely resembles venture capital markets. Domestically, local 
exchanges allowed Somalis to invest directly. For example, in Haradheere, a stalwart 
town of pirate support, investors could make investments in a 24-hour ‘stock exchange’.113 
Additional capitalisation comes from a vast network of foreign investors in Kenya, 
Dubai, Lebanon, Somalia and possibly Russia who stand to triple their initial invest-
ments.114 Piracy is also deeply integrated into the regional economy, having a ‘trickle-
down economic effect’ as pirates spend their loot on basic commodities, luxury goods, 
and services.115 Revenues from piracy have fuelled ‘a mini-construction boom along the 
coastline of the Puntland’116 and are transferred regionally through the informal banking 
system (hawal) where they enter the formal economy through the purchase of property 
and businesses.117 The revenue from piracy, it should be noted, exists as one portion of 
the trillions of dollars flowing through the world economy ‘outside of legal 
channels’.118
Legal corporate entities also make considerable profits from piracy. Insurance compa-
nies, for example, increased their rates quite substantially on ships passing through the 
Gulf of Aden. In 2008, insurance companies119 added $20,000 per voyage – up from 
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$500 the year before – totalling a $400 million increase.120 Insurance companies also 
offered premium pirate-specific packages. For example, Benfield Corporate Risk sold 
$10 million policies protecting holders against ‘kidnapping and extortion, lost ransom, 
and the cost incurred resolving the situation’.121 Private security firms sold equipment 
such as water cannons, sonic guns and electric perimeter fencing as well as providing 
on-board guards.122 Muse Professional Group and Al Qusoor – American and Yemeni 
private security firms – rented six security personnel to ships passing through the Gulf of 
Aden at a cost of roughly $100,000 per transit.123
Like their ancestors before them, pirates in the Gulf of Aden have come face-to-face 
with an overwhelming international naval force. In 2008, UN resolutions 1816 and 1838 
gave foreign countries legal authority to enter Somalia’s territorial waters to fight piracy, 
opening the doors for naval ships from more than two dozen countries to fight pirates 
under the auspices of the United States’ Combined Task Force 151, the European Union’s 
NAVFOR/Operation Atalanta, and NATO’s Operation Ocean Shield. By 2013, piracy in 
the Gulf of Aden was largely eradicated. This military defeat, however, enabled foreign 
trawlers to resume illegally harvesting Somalia’s maritime wealth.124 It also appears that 
the recent departure of international forces has encouraged pirates to return as well.125
Conclusion
Eckstein and Schwarz argue that just as ‘the imperial slave ship’ exists at the heart of the 
‘battle for modernity’, so too should the pirate ship stand in as ‘a foundational if ambiva-
lent trope which both shapes and refracts negotiations of the modern’.126 The ambivalent 
Kamola 23
127. Eichstaedt, Pirate State, 4.
128. Jeffrey Gettleman and Michael R. Gordon, ‘Pirates’ Catch Exposes Route of Arms in 
Sudan’, The New York Times, 9 December 2010, p. 11.
129. Philip E. Steinberg, Social Construction of the Ocean (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2001), 165.
130. Liam Campling and Alejandro Colás, ‘Capitalism and the Sea: Sovereignty, Territory and 
Appropriation in the Global Ocean’, Environment and Planning D: Society and Space, first 
published online, 6 November 2017, pp. 2, 15, https://doi.org/10.1177/0263775817737319.
131. Ibid., 2–3.
relation between the pirate and modern capitalist economies originates from the fact that 
pirates inhabit a position that renders visible the violent accumulation central to capitalist 
production and circulation. In this way, pirate capitalism is not outside modern capitalist 
economies but rather mirrors and mimics it rather closely. The primary difference, how-
ever, remains the fact that pirates are deemed ‘enemies’ solely based on their audacity to 
engage in the enclosure of capital itself.
Let us return to the MV Faina, the Ukrainian ship flying the Belize flag of conveni-
ence captured by Sugule Ali and his colleagues. This incident fuelled a great uproar 
stemming from the concern that the cargo of 33 T–72 tanks, grenade launchers, antiair-
craft weapons, and palates of ammunition would find their way to terrorists. The United 
States dispatched a warship to prevent the weaponry from being unloaded. And, after a 
five month standoff, Ali and his partners received a $3.2 million ransom payout, and the 
military hardware continued its voyage to the Kenyan port of Mombasa and eventually 
on to South Sudan.127 While pirates made the headlines, little attention was paid to the 
fact that a shadowy Ukrainian company was making ‘underground arm shipments’ into 
a war zone in violation of international law.128 One was deemed piracy; the other, 
business.
This liminal distinction between piracy and capitalism becomes even more telling as 
the economic and cultural figure of the pirate evolves to inhabit more than maritime 
spaces. The seamless intermodal connection between ‘movement by sea, rail, and truck’ 
increasingly conflates ‘ocean-space’ with the rest of the world economy.129 As capitalist 
accumulation continues to evolve in ways that ‘capture’ and ‘cod[e]’ the ocean by break-
ing down the ‘land-sea binary’,130 pirates similarly stake out an ever-amphibious presence 
within the world economy – operating on land, sea, and within cultural and cyberspace.
The increasingly ‘terraqueous territoriality’131 of the world economy is no less defined 
by primitive accumulation today, much of which still takes place within vast swaths of 
limited sovereignty. By no means should we be surprised, therefore, by the reoccurring 
figure of the pirate, both in shipping lanes, cyber space, on the radio, or in popular cul-
ture. We should be stunned, however, by the degree to which the Robinsonade fairy tales 
of homo economicus still pervades the constitutive fables of capitalist accumulation. The 
durability of these stories depends upon viewing the vast oceanic space of capitalism 
through the myopic lens of an isolated individual upon an unpopulated and fictional 
island. The willingness to posit Crusoe – and not the pirate – as the leading character in 
the story of capitalist accumulation demonstrates the violence that continues to define 
some (and not others) as villains living on the outskirts of the modern world economy.
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When asked by Alexander the Great ‘what he had meant by keeping hostile posses-
sion of the sea’, the pirate responded: ‘What thou meanest by seizing the whole earth, I 
am called a robber, whilst thou who dost it with a great fleet art styled emperor’.132 More 
than two millennia later, Edward Teach and Sugule Ali might similarly respond: ‘What 
do you mean calling me a robber, while calling yourself a capitalist’.
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